

Kernel Memory Management in Verified Small Kernels

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
seL4 + L4.Verified

Formally assured microkernel for systems requiring strong security guarantees

- Formally assured
 - Abstract model  Kernel code
 - Abstract model facilitate reasoning
 - Kernel code must be rigid

- Deployable in variety of system
 - Diverse requirements
 - Example
 - Partitioning
 - Temporal guarantees
 - Share resources ...
 - Kernel should support and enforce the appropriate policy

Formal Reasoning
(safety theorems)



Kernel Memory Management

- **How to manage kernels physical memory?**
 - Cache [*EROS, Cache kernel*] – No temporal predictability
 - Static allocation – Not suitable for dynamic systems
 - Quota – Underutilisation
 - Modifying the kernel – breaks refinement
- **seL4 Model:** Exports all memory allocation/deallocation decisions to user
 - No implicit allocations within the kernel
 - Kernel memory is represented as first class objects
 - Capabilities are used to confer authority
 - Inspired by early capability machines [*Cap system*]
 - Allocation takes place only on explicit user request

No single
policy

seL4 Model

Advantages

- Supports diverse policies by modifying user-level code
- Supports co-existing policies
- Confinement of authority guarantees confinement of physical memory

Status:

- Formal proof of spatial partitioning
- Haskell prototype & C/C++ version of the kernel
- Performance evaluation/refinement – on going research

Thanks

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Thanks!